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Abstract
This study explores the association between audit committee characteristics
and the establishment of a risk management committee by Malaysian listed
firms. The study predicts that firms with more independent, expert, and diligent
audit committees are likely to establish a stand-alone risk management
committee. It is also expected that audit committees with more members are
also likely to support the establishment of a risk management committee. The
study employs a cross-sectional analysis of 690 firms listed on the Bursa
Malaysia for the financial year ending in 2003. A logistic regression analysis
is used to estimate the relationships proposed in the hypotheses. The study
finds a strong support for an association between the establishment of risk
management committee and audit committee independence, audit committee
size, and audit committee diligence. The results also show that the
establishment of a risk management committee is positively and significantly
associated with firm-specific variables such as firm size, complexity of a firm’s
operations, and the use of Big Four audit firms.
Keywords: audit committee, corporate governance, risk management,
internal control.
Introduction
Heightened awareness of risk management, in recent years, has been largely
due to many recent corporate disasters and unexpected business failures
(Walker, Shenkir, and Barton, 2002). Investors are becoming alert to the
importance of sources of risk and uncertainty. Company directors, as a result,
have been required to report their internal control mechanisms to mitigate various
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risks faced by their companies. In 2004, the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the
Treadway Commission (COSO) (2004) issued its Enterprise Risk Management – Integrated
Framework that provides a model of the enterprise risk management (ERM) process. The
COSO framework views ERM as an on-going, systematic process that involves board and
senior management understanding future events that can strategically affect the
organization.
Risk management has also become more of a focus for committees of the board. The audit,
finance, or risk management committee of the board generally considers risk management.
Recent literature indicates that audit committees are becoming increasingly involved in
risk management but there are doubts about the robustness of the challenge that audit
committees can offer to risk management effectiveness. For instance, Zaman (2001)
suggests that it is unreasonable to expect audit committees to perform more than high
level reviews given their lack of expertise and time, especially following the additional
responsibilities imposed upon them by the various codes on corporate governance (e.g.,
Combined Code, FRC, 2006; Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance, SC, 2007) and
legislative reforms (e.g., Sarbane-Oxley Act, 2002) [1]. IIA (2004) emphasizes the separation
of internal audit from risk management process, but the requirement for internal auditors
to comment on the appropriateness of risk management leads internal auditors to new
territory. This implies a depth understanding of some internal audit function may not
possess (Fraser and Henry, 2004) [2]. New requirements, for instance, from stock exchanges
and reporting standards bodies, also place additional responsibility on the board of
directors and audit committees to implement strong internal control processes, which
often includes a more proactive and continuous process that assesses, sources, measures
, and manages risk across the firm. Consequently, firms gradually shift their corporate
governance focus from legal and regulatory compliance to broader-based business risks
(Power, 2000). The preceding discussion, therefore, supports the call for a stand-alone
risk management function to help strengthen the internal control system of a firm.
Despite the heightened awareness of risk management and interest in risk management,
little research has been conducted on the topic (Liebenberg and Hoyt, 2003). This is
especially true in accounting and corporate governance literature (Beasley, Clune, and
Hermanson, 2005). The lack of research is largely due to the lack of meaningful data on
risk management practices (Tufano, 1996). The dearth of research in risk management and
corporate governance, in general, motivates this study to explore factors that are likely to
lead to the establishment of a risk management committee as one of the board committees
by boards of directors of Malaysian listed firms. Specifically, the study examines whether
the establishment of a risk management committee is associated with audit committee
characteristics. An audit committee that has more members and more independent, expert
and diligent is likely to support the board of directors to establish a stand-alone risk
management committee, thus demonstrating its commitment to improving overall
governance environment of a firm.
This study makes an important contribution to risk management and audit committee
literature. The study not only explores the factors associated with the establishment of a
risk management committee but it also provides insights into the characteristics of audit
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committees of Malaysian listed firms. The study is undertaken in institutional environment
where firms are required to form an audit committee and disclose internal control compliance
while no similar requirements are imposed concerning the establishment of other board
committees such as risk management committees to solely focus on risk management and
mitigation activities.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. The next section briefly explains the
Malaysian corporate governance environment. This is followed by a section on the
theoretical background of the study and the development of the hypotheses. The third
section describes the data and the research method employed. The results of the study
are reported in the fourth section while in the final section, conclusions are drawn and the
implications and future research are discussed.
Malaysian Corporate Governance Environment
Besides statutory legislations, the Securities Commission of Malaysia (SC) has issued
various non-legislative rules. One of the most important and comprehensive self-
administered and non-legislative regulation that applies to all public listed companies
(PLCs) is the Bursa Malaysia Listing Requirements (formerly known as the KLSE Listing
Requirements) [3]. The Listing Requirements underwent a comprehensive revamp and
the new version, known as the KLSE Revamped Listing Requirements were released in
January 2001. Specifically, the Revamp Listing Requirements incorporates a significant
component of the recommendations contained in the Finance Committee on Corporate
Governance Report (FCCG, 1999), particularly the Malaysian Code on Corporate
Governance (MCCG). The Revamped Listing Requirements of Bursa Malaysia in 2001
mandate all listed firms to disclose their compliance with the MCCG in the annual reports.
Other than the audit committee which has been mandated since 1993, the Malaysian Code
on Corporate Governance also recommends that the board of directors establish
remuneration and nomination committees. The establishment of other committees such
as a risk management committee and a corporate governance committee is also
recommended but these committees are less frequently set up by listed firms. The
Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance also states as principle that the board of
directors should maintain a sound system of internal control. In May 2000, the Bursa
Malaysia issued “A Guidance on Internal Control”. This guideline explains the key
areas that directors must pay attention to before they make A Statement of Internal
Control in their companies’ annual reports. The guideline emphasizes the need for proper
risk management which is a critical element of a sound system of internal control. In
making the Internal Control Statement, a listed firm is required to address issues related
to internal controls as recommended by the Principle and Best Practices in the Malaysian
Code on Corporate Governance. The recommendations include that the board of directors
should: i) maintain a sound system of internal control to protect shareholders’ investment
and the firm’s assets, ii) identify principal risks and ensure the implementation of appropriate
system to manage risk, and iii) review adequacy and the integrity of the firm’s internal
control systems.
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While significant improvement has been achieved, the Malaysian Code on Corporate
Governance was revised in 2007 (Securities Commission, 2007). The revision was made to
improve the quality of the boards of listed firms by putting in place criteria for qualification
of directors and strengthening the audit committees as well as the internal audit functions
of listed firms. In the revised Code, audit committees can no longer be comprised of
executive directors and the internal audit function is mandated for all listed firms.
Theoretical Background and Research Hypotheses
Consistent with the risk-based approach, a firm that establishes a risk management
committee as one of the board committees demonstrates a greater awareness of the
importance of risk management and control (Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of
the Treadway Commission (COSO), 1992 and 2004; Hermanson, 2003; Selim and McNamee,
1999). Risk management activities of a firm are also closely monitored by its audit committee.
The primary task of the audit committee is to oversee the firm’s financial performance and
ensure the reliability of its financial reporting. Periodic review of the firm’s risk management
and mitigation system and the managerial actions used to manage its risk is critical towards
fulfilling this task. Hence, in the context of good corporate governance practices,
characteristics contributing to audit committee effectiveness are likely to be positively
associated with the establishment of a risk management committee.
The characteristic most frequently cited in the existing literature and corporate governance
guidelines as a prerequisite to an effective audit committee monitoring is independence.
The assertion that audit committees be composed of non-employee directors assumes
that independent outside members are better monitors of management (Sarbane-Oxley
Act, 2002; Blue Ribbon Committee, 1999). The Listing Requirements of Bursa Malaysia
also mandates that audit committees of listed firms be comprised of at least three members
and the majority of whom must be independent members. This view is consistent with the
agency perspective, in that, independent audit committees provide greater monitoring of
managerial discretions including risk-taking activities by managers. In addition,
independent audit committee members are likely to view their service on an audit committee
as a means of enhancing their reputational capital (Fama and Jensen, 1983a; Gilson, 1990).
The preservation of reputational capital serves as a motivation for higher quality
monitoring. It is, therefore, expected that an independent audit committee provides effective
monitoring and helps strengthen internal controls. Thus, consistent with a risk-based
approach, an independent audit committee is likely to support the establishment of a risk
management committee because it is beneficial and useful to audit committee, for instance,
in reviewing the firm’s risk assessment system. The preceding argument leads to the first
hypothesis which tests the assertion that a more independent audit committee is likely to
set up a risk management committee.
H1: The establishment of a risk management committee is positively associated with the
proportion of non-executive directors on audit committees.
The new rules set by Sarbane-Oxley Act 2002 require the presence of at least one
financially knowledgeable director on the audit committee while the New York Stock
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Exchange (NYSE) listed company manual also requires that all members of the audit
committee be financially knowledgeable. The Listing Requirements of Bursa Malaysia
also mandates that at least one audit committee member must be a member of the Malaysian
Institute of Accountants. Audit committee members with financial and accounting
knowledge expertise allows for a better understanding of auditing issues and risks, as
well as the audit procedures proposed to address and detect these issues and risks
(DeZoort and Salterio, 2001). Because the audit committee members with financial
backgrounds have the experience and training to understand the risk management
activities, it is expected that firms with at least one financially knowledgeable director on
their audit committees to engage more actively in risk management process. Therefore,
the preceding argument generates the following hypothesis:
H2: The establishment of a risk management committee is positively associated with the
proportion of audit committee members with accounting and finance qualifications.
In addition to imposing the presence of independent and financially knowledgeable
directors on audit committee, the NYSE’s listed company manual requires that audit
committee be composed of at least three members. Similarly, the Listing Requirements of
Bursa Malaysia also impose that audit committees of its listed companies be comprised of
at least three members. This rule is likely motivated by the desire to encourage firms to
devote significant director resources to their audit committees. The audit committee size
recommendation is also consistent with the desire to increase the organizational status of
the audit committee (Braiotta, 2000). Hence, it is expected that larger audit committees are
likely to support the establishment of a risk management committee as this will enhance
their oversight responsibility. The following hypothesis is therefore tested:
H3: The establishment of a risk management committee is positively associated with
audit committees that have more members.
A number of studies and governance practice guidelines also call for audit committees to
be diligent in carrying out their duties (Beasley, Carcello, and Hermanson, 1999; Horton et
al., 2000; Blue Ribbon Committee, 1999). Generally, studies on audit committees use the
number of audit committee meetings held annually as a proxy for audit committee diligence.
Prior research also suggests that an audit committee that meets frequently can reduce the
incident of financial reporting problems. By meeting frequently, for instance, with external
auditors and managers, the audit committee remains informed and knowledgeable about
accounting and risk management issues, and is likely to address difficult accounting and
auditing issues effectively (Raghunandan, Rama, and Scarbrough, 1998). The collaboration
between the audit committee and management is likely to result in developing a risk
management approach to provide a steady stream of information to the firm’s decision
makers. Management and audit committees have increased their oversight diligence under
the Sarbane-Oxley (SOX) regime. Recent studies and reports on audit committee behavior
show that audit committees of US listed firms are meeting more frequently, getting better
information on the state of internal control and asking better questions, suggesting an
increase in oversight duties of audit committees in recent years (Leech, 2005). Therefore,
an audit committee that demonstrates a greater diligence in discharging its oversight
responsibilities is likely to enhance the level of oversight of the risk management activities.
Chap 2-P76.pmd 9/18/09, 12:45 PM23
Malaysian Accounting Review, Vol. 8 No. 1, 19-36, 2009
24
As such, it is expected that more diligent audit committees are likely to support the
establishment of a risk management committee. The discussion above leads to the
following hypothesis:
H4: The establishment of a risk management committee is positively associated with
audit committee diligence.
Data, Variables, and Empirical Method
Data Collection
The sample comprises the Bursa Malaysia non-financial public listed companies whose
annual reports are available in 2003 [4]. The firms in the sample are either listed on the
Main Board or the Second Board of the Bursa Malaysia. The Main Board companies have
a minimum paid-up capital of RM60 million while the Second Board companies are those
that have a minimum paid-up capital of RM40 million. Both the financial data and corporate
data of these firms are obtained from their annual reports. A total of 690 firms that meet the
selection criteria are included in the study.
Variables
The study tests four hypotheses using a logistic regression model, with the dependent
variable coded as “1” if a firm has a stand-alone risk management committee, “0” if
otherwise. The hypothesized variables used in the study are audit committee independence,
audit committee expertise, audit committee size, and audit committee diligence. Audit
committee independence and audit committee expertise are measured as the percentage
of non-executive directors on boards and the percentage of audit committee members
with finance and accounting qualifications respectively. While the number of audit
committee members on audit committees and the number of audit committee meetings
held during the financial year measure audit committee size and audit committee diligence.
The study also incorporates several control variables found by related literature that may
influence the likelihood of firms establishing a risk management committee. It is expected
that the establishment of a risk management committee to be positively associated with
firm size, complexity of a firm’s operations and decentralized business segments, firm
leverage, and the use of Big Four audit firms. Wallace and Kreutsfeldt (1991) identify firm
size as one of the firm characteristics that could influence a firm’s decision to set up an
internal control mechanism. Top management is more likely to lose direct control of the
firm’s operations and risk-taking investments in large firms. Hence, firms listed on the
Main Board of Bursa Malaysia are, therefore, more likely to set up a stand-alone risk
management committee. As a proxy for firm size, the study uses a dummy variable of “1”
if a firm is listed on the Main Board of Bursa Malaysia, and “0” if otherwise [5]. In addition,
the complexity of a firm’s operations and decentralized business segments also may
require a more effective risk management mechanism so that the management may benefit
from clear and comparable details of risks that different divisions or business units face
(Boswell, 2001). To control for the effect of a firm’s complexity, the square root of the
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number of subsidiaries is used. The effect of leverage is also controlled in the analysis as
the risks associated with a high level of leverage may require firms to evaluate risks on a
firm-wide basis. Firms with a high level of leverage are likely to demonstrate their
commitment to the existing debt holders and to their future creditors that they have a
better disclosure of their firms’ risk exposures (Liebenberg and Hoyt, 2003). Thus, the
ratio of total debts to total assets is used to control for the effect of leverage. The study
also includes dummy variable for Big Four audit firms to control for differences in audit
quality. The Big Four audit firms may be more likely to ensure transparency and eliminate
mistakes in a firm’s financial statements because they have a greater reputation to uphold
(Michaely and Shaw, 1995). It is also possible that firms committed to engaging high
quality auditors are also more likely to be committed to a holistic risk management
framework (Beasley, Clune, and Hermanson, 2005). As a result, a firm whose auditor is one
of the Big Four audit firms is likely to set up a risk management committee to monitor
operations and internal control of the firm more effectively. Finally, industry variations
may influence firms to establish a risk management committee. Anecdotal evidence
suggests that certain industries are more likely to adopt a holistic risk management approach
than others. To control for industry variations, ten industry dummy variables according
to sectors classified by the Bursa Malaysia are included in the model. The sectors are
industrial products, consumer products, technology, construction, trade and services,
properties, plantations, hotel, mining, and infrastructure companies [6].
Research Model
The following regression model is used to examine the association between the
establishment of a risk management committee and audit committee characteristics. The
hypothesized variables and control variables are described in Figure 1.
RMC = b0 + b1Firm Size + b2Complexity + b3Leverage + b4Big Four + b5Industry Dummies
+ b6AC Independence + b7AC Expertise + b8AC Size + b9AC Diligence + e
Results
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for the variables used in the model and Table 2
reports correlation [7]. Panel B of Table 1 shows that only 246 firms (about 36 percent) in
the sample establish a risk management committee [8]. Panel B also shows that 69 percent
of the firms’ financial statements are audited by the Big Four audit firms. The majority of
firms in the sample (470 firms) are listed on the Main Board of Bursa Malaysia.
Panel A indicates that total assets of firms in the sample range from RM4,982,000 to
RM59,956,500,000 with a mean of RM1,222,170,918. The mean number of subsidiaries
is 11.52 ranging from 0 to 290. Panel A also shows that the mean percentage of non-
executive directors on the audit committee is 79 percent. The average number of
directors on the audit committee with finance and accounting qualifications is about
three directors while the average number of directors on the audit committee is three.
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Figure 1: Description of Explanatory Variables
Variables
Dependent
Variable
Independent
Variables
Descriptions
A dummy variable of “1” if a firm sets up a stand-alone
risk management committee, “0” if otherwise.
A dummy variable of “1” if a firm is listed on the Main
Board of Bursa Malaysia, “0” if otherwise [5].
The square root of the number of subsidiaries.
The ratio of total debts to total assets.
A dummy variable of “1” if a firm’s auditor is a Big Four
auditor, “0” if otherwise.
A dummy variable of “1” if a firm is in industrial product
sector, or in consumer product sector, or in construction
sector, or in technology sector, or in trade and services
sector, or in property sector, or in plantations sector, or
in hotel sector, or in infrastructure companies sector, or
in mining sector, “0” if otherwise.
The percentage of non-executive directors on audit
committees.
The percentage of audit committee members with finance
and accounting qualifications.
The number of directors served on audit committees.
The number of meetings held by audit committees during
the financial year.
RMC
Firm Size
Complexity
Leverage
Big Four
Industry
Dummies
AC
Independence
AC Expertise
AC Size
AC Diligence
Finally, on average, there are five audit committee meetings held during the financial
year of 2003 (minimum of 1, maximum of 21).
Multivariate Analysis
Table 3 reports the logistic regression model. This model shows factors that are associated
with a firm’s decision to set up a risk management committee. The model is significant,
with pseudo R-squares of 7.9 percent using Cox-Snell R-square and 10.9 percent using
Nagelkerke R-square [9]. The regression results in Table 3 indicate that the establishment
of a risk management committee is positively associated with firm size (p-value = 0.001)
suggesting that firms listed on the Main Board of Bursa Malaysia (i.e., large firms with
their paid-up capital of RM60 millions or more) are more likely to set up a stand-alone risk
management committee [10]. It is expected that larger firms are more likely to adopt a more
stringent and focused risk management mechanism due to the need for a comprehensive
risk management strategy. This finding is consistent with findings previously documented
by Colquitt, Hoyt, and Lee (1999) and Goodwin-Stewart and Kent (2006). Colquitt et al.
(1999) find that firm size is significant in whether a firm uses integrated risk management
tools. While Goodwin-Stewart and Kent (2006) suggest that a large diversified firm is
more likely to rely on internal audit to ensure that the internal control system is adequate.
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Table 3: Logistic Regression Results (Dependent Variable: Existence of a Risk
Management Committee) (N = 690 Firms)
Variables Expected Signs Coeeficients Wald Statistics (p-value)
Intercept ? -3.976 29.136 (0.000)*
Firm Size + 0.658 10.935 (0.001)*
Complexity + 0.138 6.941 (0.008)*
Leverage + 0.045 0.014 (0.905)
Big Four + 0.555 8.474 (0.004)*
AC Independence + 1.001 3.208 (0.073)*
AC Expertise + 0.032 0.006 (0.940)
AC Size + 0.204 3.170 (0.075)*
AC Diligence + 0.113 3.124 (0.077)*
Cox-Snell R2 (Nagelkerke R2) 0.079 (0.109)
Hosmer-Lemeshow χ2 (p-value) 8.603 (0.377)
Notes: *One-tail test where direction is predicted, otherwise two-tail. Firm Size = a dummy
variable of “1” if a firm is listed on the Main Board of Bursa Malaysia, “0” if otherwise; Complexity
= square root of the number of subsidiaries; Leverage = the ratio of book value of long-term debts
to total assets; Big Four = a dummy variable of “1” if a firm’s financial statements are audited by Big
Four audit firms, “0” if otherwise; AC Independence = the percentage of non-executive directors on
audit committees; AC Expertise = the percentage of audit committee members with finance and
accounting qualifications; AC Size = the number of directors in audit committees; AC Diligence =
the number of meetings held by audit committees during the financial year.
There is also a significant positive association between the establishment of a risk
management committee and the complexity of a firm’s business operations (p-value =
0.004, one-tailed). The positive association suggests that larger firms and the complexity
of firm’s operations require greater monitoring from a risk management committee which
focuses primarily on identifying business risks and finds ways to mitigate these risks
(Selim and McNamee, 1999; Spira, 2003). The results also show that there is no significant
association between the establishment of a risk management committee and leverage.
Firms whose financial statements are audited by the Big Four audit firms are likely to set
up a risk management committee as indicated by a positive and significant association
between the two variables (p-value = 0.002, one-tailed). One interpretation of this finding
is that Big Four audit firms provide higher quality audits (DeAngelo, 1981). Further,
Dopuch and Simunic (1980) suggest that credibility is associated with an auditor’s
reputation or brand name, based on the observed dominance of large audit firms in the
market for publicly-held firm auditors. Because Big Four auditors have a greater reputation
to uphold, they are likely to require firms to have a sound internal control system, including
the establishment of a risk management committee. Alternatively, it is also possible that
firms engaging such high quality auditors are also more committed to risk management.
The unreported results also show that the establishment of a risk management committee
is not significantly related to all industry dummies [11].
Recall that Hypotheses 1 and 2 predict that more independent and expert audit committees
are likely to set up a risk management committee. The results in Table 3 show that there is
a significant positive association between the establishment of a risk management
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committee and the percentage of non-executive directors on audit committees (p-value =
0.037, one-tailed). An independent audit committee is likely to encourage a proactive risk
management process to reduce not only business and financial risks but also reputational
risks faced by independent directors who sit on the audit committee. Independent audit
committee directors are likely to view their service on an audit committee as a means of
enhancing their reputational capital (Fama and Jensen, 1983a; Gilson, 1990). The
preservation of reputational capital serves as one motivation for higher quality monitoring
by independent audit committees. Thus, establishing a risk management committee helps
strengthen a firm’s internal control system and demonstrates an effort towards preserving
their reputation as expert monitors.
The results also show that there is no support for Hypothesis 2 concerning an association
between audit committee expertise and the establishment of a risk management committee.
This may suggest that accounting and finance expertise possessed by audit committee
members plays an insignificant role in setting up the risk management committee and the
qualifications they have tend to be more useful in auditing and financial reporting matters.
This finding also indicates that performing functions of a risk management committee
does not require the knowledge of finance and accounting as this committee is mostly
involved in identifying and mitigating risks associated with firm operations and businesses.
This finding is somewhat consistent with that of Goodwin-Stewart and Kent (2006) in that
they find a marginally significant association exists between audit committee expertise
and the use of internal audit.
Table 3 also shows a significant positive association between the establishment of a risk
management committee and audit committee size (p-value 0.038, one-tailed) and audit
committee diligence (p-value = 0.039, one-tailed). This suggests that large audit committees
are likely to enhance the quality of internal control, thus supporting the establishment of
a risk management committee. Kalbers and Fogarty (1993) suggest that larger audit
committees are legitimized by a meaningful organizational support from boards of directors
and are thus more likely to be acknowledged as an authoritative body by external auditors
as well as by internal audit functions of firms. With respect to positive significant association
between the establishment of a risk management committee and audit committee diligence,
this result suggests that meeting frequency is an important component of audit committee
effectiveness (National Association of Corporate Directors (NACD), 2000). An audit
committee that demonstrates greater diligence in discharging its responsibilities is likely
to seek an enhanced level of oversight of, among others, business operations and risk
management and control activities.
Overall, the results indicate that firm-specific variables that are commonly associated with
risk management and internal control functions are positive and significantly associated
with the establishment of a risk management committee. Of particular interest to the study
are the audit committee characteristics. Firms that have independent, diligent, and larger
audit committees are found to be more likely to set up a stand-alone risk management
committee. This demonstrates that risk management links neatly to good corporate
governance practices within a firm as evidenced by the positive and significant association
between the establishment of a risk management committee and these three audit committee
characteristics.
Chap 2-P76.pmd 9/18/09, 12:45 PM30
Audit Committee Characteristics and Risk Management of Malaysian Listed Firms
31
Conclusion, Limitations and Future Research
This study provides an initial attempt to explore the association between the establishment
of a risk management committee and audit committee characteristics of Malaysian listed
firms. Hypotheses are developed based on the premise that firms that have more
independent, expert, and diligent audit committees are likely to set up a stand-alone risk
management committee. In addition, audit committees that have more members are also
likely to form a risk management committee to help strengthen governance and internal
control environment within their firms. The study finds that the establishment of a risk
management committee is associated with strong audit committee structures. Specifically,
the results show that firms with more independent audit committees are likely to set up a
risk management committee partly because these independent directors seek to protect
their reputations as expert monitors. Thus, establishing a risk management committee
demonstrates their commitment to and awareness of improved internal control
environment. Further, firms with more members on their audit committees are also likely to
set up a risk management committee. Audit committees that meet more frequently are also
likely to enhance level of oversight of risk management activities and processes. Thus,
more diligent audit committees are likely to support formal risk management procedures
including an establishment of a risk management committee.
While the study makes an important contribution to the governance and internal control
debates, there are a number of limitations inherent in this study. One of the limitations is
that in addition to archival data, data gathered using survey methods are likely to provide
more meaningful insights to findings of the study. Some of the variables used in the model
may not be good proxies for factors the study measures. For instance, the percentage of
non-executive directors on audit committees may not be a good measure of “true” audit
committee independence as these are “grey” directors. Further, board characteristics are
not considered in this study. Board independence, for instance, is likely to contribute to
a sound internal control system and risk management process as a risk management
committee is one of board committees. Finally, this study employs cross-sectional data of
the financial year 2003. It is likely that the establishment of a risk management committee
by Malaysian listed firms has increased [4, 8]. Recent corporate governance scandals
have significantly increased expectations about the roles of corporate governance
participants including regulators and local and international investors. Some of these
expectations relate to calls for expanded risk management activities. Finally, the results of
the study are subject to a caveat and therefore, should be cautiously interpreted. There is
a growing evidence that corporate governance structures may be jointly determined
partially by unobservable variables such as past performance, risks, and the stage of
business cycles (see for instance studies by Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998 and 2003;
Bhagat and Black, 2002; and Adams and Ferreira, 2007 for a comprehensive discussion
related to endogeneity problems and econometric approaches dealing with them in
corporate governance research). Consequently, studies that do not control for possible
endogeneity are likely to limit the validity of empirical testing of models. This study,
therefore, may suffer from endogeneity problems as it does not control for the extent to
which endogeneity may be present in the model the study employs. The existing research
in corporate governance cannot yet offer a comprehensive system of well-specified audit
committee design equations.
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These limitations could be overcome in future research. Research methods such as
interviews and surveys may be complementary to the archival data method and are likely
to help explain why firms choose to set up a risk management committee. The role of
holistic risk management process and the changing paradigm of internal auditing are
relatively unexplored and there is a need for future research on this issue. Another issue
warranting further analysis is the status of a risk management committee within the firm,
and the role of the committee plays in corporate governance and its interaction with the
audit committee. Finally, risk management has become a managerial concern and the
committee members are mostly from management, thus its independence and objectives
may be questioned. Issues with regards to internal control status and risk management
process may not be adequately addressed by firm management and the board of directors
may not get a clear picture of management’s risk appetites and risk-taking behaviors. A
future study may examine the independence of the risk management committee and how
the board and the audit committee may have to step up their oversight efforts to avoid
managerial manipulations. Finally, future research needs to address endogeneity problems
that may arise due to unobservable variables that are likely to jointly determine the
outcomes of chosen corporate governance mechanisms adopted by firms.
Notes
1 Turnbull Report (1999) suggests that responsibility for risk management could be
delegated to the audit committee and in many organizations, internal audit reports
directly to the audit committee on risk management. However, if the expertise of both
internal auditors and audit committee members lies in financial matters, there is a
possibility that only a limited range of risks will be addressed.
2 Malaysian companies without a stand-alone risk management committee report that
the oversight of their risk management and control activities is embedded in the
internal audit functions (IAF) which report to their audit committees on the state of
their internal controls. A survey of 380 publicly-listed Malaysian firms by the Institute
of Internal Auditors Malaysia also reveals that 58 percent of these firms have their
own internal audit function (IAF) (IIA Malaysia, 2003).
3 The Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (KLSE) became demutualized exchange and was
renamed Bursa Malaysia in April 2004.
4 The concern of outdated data used in this study is understandably valid.
Nevertheless, the data are important and relevant to the context of the study.
Irrespective of the period of the study used, little has changed with respect to the
corporate governance environment in Malaysia since the incorporation of the
Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance (MCCG) into the Listing Requirements of
Bursa Malaysia in 2001. In 2007, the Code was revised and some significant
amendments with regard to audit committee and internal control requirements include:
i) audit committees can no longer be comprised of executive directors and ii) the
internal audit function is mandated for all listed firms. In addition to various existing
mandated corporate governance disclosures, all listed firms are now required to make
a statement in their annual reports on the CSR activities undertaken during a financial
year starting from financial year end 2008. I examined the most recent annual reports
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(i.e., financial years of 2007 and 2008) and corporate governance disclosures of the
sample firms used in the study. The audit committee variables used in this study such
as audit committee independence, audit committee expertise, audit committee size,
and audit committee diligence remain qualitatively and statistically similar to those
reported in 2003. The only noticeable change is the increase in the number of firms
setting up the risk management committee. The current study finds that 246 firms out
of 690 firms have established the committee as a stand-alone committee. There are 43
firms in the sample which previously did not have a stand-alone risk management
committee have recently established the committee.
5 The natural log of total assets is also used as a measure of firm size.
6 This study excludes firms related to financial industries such as banks and insurance
companies due to their unique characteristics and different compliance and regulatory
environment. Other studies such as Beasley, Clune and Hermanson (2005) include
banks and insurance companies in the sample due to explicit calls from industry
regulators and leaders for more effective risk management.
7 The study performs a number of diagnostics on the results reported in Table 1, 2, and
3 including investigation of outliers for both control and audit committee variables.
The variables with univariate outliers include firm size, leverage, firm’s complexity
(subsidiaries), and frequency of audit committee meetings. To test whether the outliers
alter the results, the outlying observations whose standardized z-scores exceed ± 3
are excluded and the model is re-run. The unreported results are qualitatively similar,
and quantitatively unchanged as those reported in the tables. Standard diagnostic
tests indicate that multicollinearity is not a serious problem.
8 As mentioned in Note 4, there are 43 firms in the sample which previously did not
have a stand-alone risk management committee have recently established the
committee.
9 For the Hosmer-Lemeshow Goodness of Fit Test, a good fit is indicated by a significant
value greater than 0.05.
10 The unreported results also shows that there exists a positive and significant
association between the establishment of a risk management committee and the
natural log of total assets (i.e., firm size) (coefficient = 0.375; Wald statistic = 21.317;
p-value = 0.000).
11 In order to have a parsimonious model and also due to their non-significant
associations with the likelihood of the establishment of a risk management committee,
the industry dummy variables are excluded and the model is re-run. The results
remain qualitatively and statistically unchanged after excluding the industry variables
from the model.
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